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A basic premise of representative democracy is that every person subject to policy
should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable
governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper
uses political reservation in India to examine the role of mandated political represen-
tation in providing such groups policy influence. The Indian constitution mandates
political reservation for disadvantaged castes and tribes in state elections – only mem-
bers of these groups can stand for election in reserved jurisdictions. I find that political
reservation in Indian states has increased targeted transfers to groups which benefit
from the mandate. This finding underlines the importance of political representation
in providing disadvantaged minorities political voice. It also suggests that complete
policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.
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1 Introduction
There are strong moral and economic arguments suggesting that it is in the interest of
society to improve the economic standing of historically disadvantaged minority groups.1
These arguments are particularly compelling in the case of India, where the hierarchical
caste system has contributed to the economic deprivation of those born into low ranked
castes.2 At Independence, the Indian State committed to use public policy to end caste-based
discrimination, and to improve the economic status of disadvantaged groups. Arguably, the
centerpiece of this endeavor has been the use of mandated political representation in favor
of these groups.
This paper examines the impact of mandated political representation on state-level policy
outcomes in India. Prior to every state election, a specified number of jurisdictions are
(separately) declared reserved for disadvantaged castes and tribes. Only members of the
group which benefit from reservation can stand for election. However, the entire electorate
votes over the set of candidates. The effect of the mandate is to alter legislator identity
without affecting voter identity.
In most democracies, minority groups tend not to get selected as candidates by parties,
and therefore are under represented in the legislature [Rule and Zimmerman 1994]. While
many countries have experimented with mandates which seek to increase minority repre-
sentation in the political process, the Indian experiment remains, by far, the most radical
[Grofman and Lijphart 1986]. The placing of requirements on candidate identity in reserved
jurisdictions directly increases the political representation afforded to minority groups in the
legislature. It is also amongst the largest experiments of its kind – a quarter of all legislators
in India, at both the national and state level, come from reserved jurisdictions.
All experiments in mandated political representation are predicated on the assump-
tion that legislative capture by non-minority groups adversely affects the policy interests of
minority groups, and that parties cannot fully control candidate behavior after elections.
However, this assumption is invalid if parties and voters can ensure that candidate behavior
1Historically disadvantaged groups are commonly defined as groups which have been systematically ex-
cluded from institutions and cultural practices that provide skills and resources. An important moral argu-
ment for directing public policy at such groups is that historical discrimination against a group should not
be allowed to inhibit its members present day well-being. Moreover, such policies may enhance efficiency by
improving the talent allocation across different occupations [Holzer and Neumark 2000].
2For instance, Manu Smriti, the definitive treatise on caste system, decrees that the dwelling of low
castes be outside the village, and their wealth be dogs and donkeys. It states that an upper caste may take
possession of the property of a low caste with perfect peace of mind (Manu Smriti VIII:417, X:52).
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after elections is guided by the commitments they made beforehand – a standard assump-
tion in many political economy models [Downs 1957]. An analysis of the policy impact of
political reservation provides a direct empirical test of this assumption.
The first part of the paper discusses the features of the political process which affect the
impact of political reservation on policy outcomes. I show that the effectiveness of politi-
cal reservation in altering policy outcomes depends on the nature of the contract between
the electorate and the elected, of which two important elements are candidates’ ability to
commit to policies and the structure of legislative bargaining. Changes in legislator identity
induced by political reservation can only affect policy in the absence of full policy commit-
ment. Moreover, such changes may not be significant unless every legislator has voice in the
policymaking process.
The remainder of the paper provides empirical evidence on the policy impact of political
reservation in India. I use a state-level panel data set to examine whether political reserva-
tion for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in state elections has affected policy-making.
A state-level analysis is appropriate as India is a federal democracy, with states enjoying
substantial independent policy-making powers. Moreover, the choice of affirmative action
policies in favor of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes has been an important element of
policy activism in these states [Parikh 1997].
The Indian constitution mandates that the extent of state-level political reservation
enjoyed by a group reflects the group’s population share in the state. Moreover, the extent of
political reservation can be revised only when new census population estimates are received.
Hence, while a group’s population share varies annually, the proportion of jurisdictions
reserved for it change with a lag – that is, only at the point of election, and after fresh
census population estimates for the group are received.
These institutional features of political reservation allow me to make empirical headway
in isolating the policy impact of changes in legislator identity. I use state-specific over time
changes in the extent of political reservation to identify the impact of changes in the group
shares of minority legislators on policy outcomes. The timing of such changes are determined
by institutional features of the mandate. Moreover, the time-lag in the responsiveness of
the political reservation series to population changes implies that I can separately control
for the two groups population shares in the regression. This allows me to disentangle the
policy effects of changes in the political representation afforded to a group from those due
to changes in its population share. The lag in the responsiveness of political reservation to
population changes forms the centerpiece of my identification strategy, and the empirical
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analysis provides evidence on the validity of the assumptions underlying this strategy.
The main finding is that political reservation in Indian states has increased targeted
transfers to the groups which benefit from political reservation. Such increases have not
been accompanied by increases in overall spending, but instead appear to have come at the
expense of general redistribution programs such as education spending. These findings point
to the centrality of political representation in providing a group policy influence. Moreover,
in conjunction with my theoretical findings, they suggest that complete policy commitment
may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the features of
the political process which affect the policy impact of political reservation, and Section 3 the
institution of political reservation, as practiced in India. Section 4 presents the empirical
findings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Political reservation and the political process
Understanding the link, if any, between a candidate’s group identity and policy outcomes is
central to the correct modelling of political party and voter behavior. Early political econ-
omy models assumed that parties can commit their candidates to policies prior to elections,
i.e. full policy commitment is feasible. In this case electorally minded parties will commit
to the policy favored by a majority of voters [Downs 1957]. A more recent political economy
literature has argued that existing political institutions cannot enforce full policy commit-
ment (Osborne and Slivinski [1996], Besley and Coate [1997]). In situations of incomplete
policy commitment, candidates’ policy preferences, which are usually correlated with their
group identity, affect their electoral appeal.3 Such models of policy-making predict that
increases in political representation afforded to a group will enhance its policy influence.
Recent empirical papers in political economy also reject the main predictions of full policy
commitment models. Candidates (parties) do not exhibit policy convergence, and their
policy choices differ systematically from the median voter’s preferences. Kalt and Zupan
[1985] and Levitt [1996] show that a candidate’s personal ‘ideology’ is a key determinant of
observed policy outcomes. There is, however, limited evidence on how a country’s choice of
political institutions affect the relationship between candidate identity and policy outcomes.
The goal of this paper is to address this question in the context of a specific institution –
3Husted and Kenny [1997] and Edlund and Pande [2002] provide empirical evidence that an individual’s
group identity is correlated with their policy preferences.
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political reservation.
In this Section I use a stylized model of democratic policy-making to demonstrate how
alternative assumptions about the political process affect the relationship between legislator
identity and policy outcomes, and therefore the policy impact of a mandate of political
reservation.
Consider a large population of N individuals who differ in their earning potential. An
individual supplies one unit of labor, and depending on his/her earning potential either earns
yr (rich) or earns yp (poor), where yr > yp. In addition, individuals differ with respect to
an unalterable attribute, which I call caste – an individual is born either a high (H) or a low
(L) caste. Let λkc denote the population share of individuals who belong to caste c ∈ (H,L)
and earn income yk, where k ∈ (r, p). I assume low caste citizens are a population minority











Individual utility increases with own income. Individual income, if taxed, is taxed at
rate t and is redistributed via an anonymous general transfer T and/or via a targeted
transfer δ, where δ = 0 for high caste individuals. The former redistributes from rich to
poor individuals, and the latter from high to low caste individuals. Redistribution is budget
balancing. Conditional on desiring redistribution, an individual will favor full redistribution
(i.e. t = 1). Table I describes, by income and caste, an individual’s preferred redistributive
policy. Note that the redistributive preferences of a rich low caste citizen varies with the
demographic make-up of the population – if poor low castes’ population share exceeds λ∗ she
favors no redistribution to targeted redistribution. The reason is that the per head targeted
transfer she receives is less than her income lost as tax levied to finance the transfer.
TABLE I
Preferred redistributive policy, by caste and income
Group Preferred redistributive policy
Rich high caste No redistribution
Poor high caste General redistribution







yr−yp , else no redistribution
Poor low caste Targeted redistribution
Elected legislators choose the levels of general and targeted redistribution. The extent
of policy influence enjoyed by a group of legislators is proportional to, and increasing in, its
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group size.4
For expositional clarity I assume the population is divided into Z jurisdictions, with
one legislator elected per jurisdiction.5 Elections in a jurisdiction are characterized by two
party competition, and the candidate with the highest vote share is elected. Parties are
ideologically differentiated on the income dimension – one party only has rich members
(now on, party R), and the other only poor members (now on, party P ). I assume parties
field members as candidates. Hence, the choice variable for a party is the proportion of
jurisdictions in which it fields low caste candidates. Parties seek to maximize their average
member’s income, and citizens their own income. Identical jurisdictions imply the same
electoral outcomes occurs in every jurisdiction.
I assume that in every jurisdiction a fraction α of the voters are rational, and the re-
maining (1-α) are noise voters. With two party competition sincere voting is rational.6
Rational voters know whether or not parties can commit to policies, and vote accordingly.7
Noise voters’ decisions are uncorrelated with candidate identity, and by making election
outcomes probabilistic they ensure that a voting equilibrium exists. The Mathematical Ap-
pendix describes the mapping from individuals voting decisions to electoral outcomes for
this economy.
In this environment a political equilibrium is a pair of party entry decisions that are best
responses. A party’s entry decision is the proportion of jurisdictions in which it fields low
caste candidates.
Result 1 If the proportion of low caste citizens in each party is less than their population
share, then there exists an equilibrium in which no low caste citizens are fielded as candidates
and no targeted redistribution occurs.
The proof is provided in the Mathematical Appendix. In this model a party maximizes
its average member’s payoff. As long as the party share of low castes is less than their
population share, targeted redistribution lowers this payoff. Moreover, in this model fielding
4Weingast [1979], among others, provides the micro-foundations for such a universalistic legislative bar-
gaining procedure. The Mathematical Appendix defines the precise legislative decision-making rule assumed.
5Qualitatively identical results can be derived for the single district case with proportional representation.
In such an environment political reservation would take the form of a mandate which requires that party
lists include low caste candidates, and that those candidates form a strict proportion of legislators.
6If a voter can affect the electoral outcome then she will wish to move policy towards her preferred
outcome. Since a voter can only affect the electoral outcome in the jurisdiction that she votes, this implies
voting for her preferred candidate.
7With full policy commitment a rational voter will condition her vote directly on the policy associated
with a candidate, while in its absence she will condition her vote on both the candidate’s party and group
identity.
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low caste citizens either leaves party policies unaffected, or increases targeted redistribution.
In the former case, candidate identity is irrelevant to the political process and there will exist
an equilibrium in which no low caste candidates are fielded. In the latter case, any electoral
gains associated with fielding a positive number of low caste candidates are negated by the
loss in the utility of the party’s average member (for the proof, see Mathematical Appendix).
Hence, there exists an equilibrium in which only high caste candidates are fielded.
The existence of such an equilibrium relies on the assumption that low castes party mem-
bership share is less than their population share. This assumption is in line with stylized
facts on minority political participation for most democracies, including India. Disadvan-
taged minorities tend to be under-represented in all stages of democratic policy-making.
These include party membership, entry as candidates, and representation in legislature.
Rule and Zimmerman [1994] provide cross-country evidence on this issue, and Chhibber
[1999] evidence for India.
My interest is in how the introduction of a mandate of political reservation alters the
policies associated with such an equilibrium. A mandate of political reservation requires
parties to field low caste candidates in a specified set of jurisdictions. It, thereby, ensures that
a certain proportion of legislators are low caste, while leaving the demographic composition
of the electorate unaffected. I assume the extent of political reservation for low castes equals
their population share.
Result 2 A mandate of political reservation can affect policy outcomes only if full policy
commitment is absent.
Political reservation increases the group share of low caste legislators. However, with full
policy commitment a legislator’s group identity is irrelevant to the political process. Irre-
spective of candidate identity, a party will commit its candidates to policies which maximize
the party’s expected payoff. The choice of these policies depends on the party’s objective
function, and the relationship between a party’s policy choice and its likelihood of winning.
These, in turn, depend on the demographic composition of the party’s member pool and the
voter population respectively. Neither of these are altered by political reservation. Rational
voters will condition their vote solely on the policies associated with candidates. Hence,
neither the electoral fortunes of the parties nor their choice of policies are affected by the
introduction of political reservation.
Result 3 In the absence of full policy commitment a mandate of political reservation will
increase targeted redistribution if either the population share of poor low caste citizens (λpL)
is less than λ∗, or if it increases the number of poor low caste legislators.
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If parties cannot commit to policies, then a legislator’s group identity is informative of
the policies she will pursue in the legislature. Moreover, the policy influence enjoyed by a
group of legislators is increasing in its group size. If λpL < λ
∗, then all low caste citizens
favor targeted redistribution. Political reservation directly increases the group share of low
caste legislators, and therefore the extent of targeted redistribution.
If, instead, λpL > λ
∗ then only poor low caste citizens favor targeted redistribution.
In this case the policy impact of political reservation is sensitive to the extent of political
reservation. To see this note that, irrespective of the extent of political reservation, party
R never favors redistribution. The reason is that all rich individuals oppose redistribution.
In contrast, the targeted redistribution associated with party P is increasing in the extent
of political reservation (since poor low castes favor redistribution). Consequently, if the
extent of political reservation, and therefore the targeted redistribution associated with
election of party P is too high, poor high caste citizens will switch their vote to party
R.8 Thus we can have a situation where in the absence of political reservation party P was
electorally successful, but political reservation reverses its electoral fortunes.9 Here, political
reservation increases targeted redistribution if and only if it increases the number of poor
low caste legislators.
Finally, the policy impact of political reservation is sensitive to the assumed form of leg-
islative bargaining. If the legislative bargaining procedure instead follows majoritarian rules,
i.e. the preferences of the majority group of legislators prevail, then high caste legislators
will successfully prevent targeted redistribution.
In sum, this model affords predictions on the conditions under which political reservation
will affect policies, and which policies are likely to be affected. I will bring these predictions
of the model to the data, as they give a mapping from features of the political process to
the policy impact of political reservation. The model suggests that a statistically significant
link between changes in political reservation in an Indian state and targeted transfers to the
groups benefitting from political reservation reflects the policy relevance of political repre-
sentation for a group. Moreover, it implies policy commitment in the Indian electoral system
is imperfect, and that legislative bargaining provides minority legislators policy influence.10
8This occurs whenever the proportion of jurisdictions reserved (pi )>
λr(yr−yp)
λpyp+λryr
9Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran [1996] argue that an important reason why gerrymandering in the
United States had a limited effect on the policy influence of African Americans was that it had perverse
electoral implications – in particular, it improved electoral outcomes for the Republican party in many
jurisdictions.
10The results in this Section suggest an ambiguous relationship between increases in the population share
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3 Political reservation: the institutional context
The Indian constitution mandates political reservation in favor of scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes in all state and national elections. In addition, it directs state governments
to use public policy to improve the economic well-being of these two groups.
The constitution was implemented in 1950, at which point state lists identifying specific
castes and tribes as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were established. The 1931 census
criteria and a 1950 tribal identification criteria were used to develop these lists.11 Table II
details the criteria used. These lists have since been revised twice – in 1956 to remove
anomalies, and in 1976 to remove intra-state differences in the identification of scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes. Such intra-state differences had arisen due to the reorganization
of state boundaries.
Scheduled castes make up roughly 16 percent of the Indian population, and scheduled
tribes another 8 percent. Relative to the rest of the population, these two groups are socially
and economically disadvantaged (see Table III). The incidence of poverty in these groups is
roughly one and a half times that in the rest of the population. An important reason for the
economic backwardness of scheduled castes is that the caste system traditionally assigned
members to menial occupations (such as skinning animal carcasses, removal of human waste
and working in cremation grounds), and imposed restrictions on asset ownership.12 In
the case of scheduled tribes their geographic isolation, combined with their dependence on
traditional agricultural practices for subsistence, have contributed to their relative poverty.
Article 332 of the constitution mandates political reservation in favor of both groups
in state elections. In a jurisdiction reserved for scheduled castes (scheduled tribes), only
a scheduled caste (scheduled tribe) citizen may stand for election. The entire electorate,
however, participates in choosing among candidates so qualified. Two criteria are provided
for the selection of reserved jurisdictions. First, the population concentration of the group
in a jurisdiction. Second, sufficient dispersal of reserved jurisdictions within the state.13
of poor low castes and the policy influence they wield. In particular, increases in their group size to above
λ∗ may, by making transfers to them more costly for other groups, reduce the likelihood of redistribution.
11Roughly 779 low castes and 250 tribes are identified as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes respectively.
12Over 85 percent of the Indian population is Hindu. Every Hindu belongs to a caste with caste mem-
bership hereditary. The genesis of the caste system is usually traced to the Aryan invasion of India in
approximately 1500 B.C. Caste groupings are, in general, endogamous. The caste system is hierarchical,
with a caste’s rank the primary determinant of its members occupations.
13Scheduled castes are a population minority in every jurisdiction, irrespective of its reservation status.
Relative to non-reserved jurisdictions the population share of scheduled castes is, on average, 5-6 percentage
points higher in reserved jurisdictions. In contrast, scheduled tribes are a population majority in roughly
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Section 3 of the article states that the number of jurisdictions reserved for scheduled castes
(scheduled tribes) should bear as nearly as possible, the same proportion to the total num-
ber of jurisdictions as the scheduled caste (scheduled tribe) population bears to the total
population in the state. The only permissible basis for changes in the extent of reservation
is changes in the census estimates of the group’s population share in the state.
Two independent national-level commissions are responsible for implementation of this
mandate: the Election commission which oversees state and national elections, and a three
member Delimitation commission which is constituted when fresh census estimates arrive.14
The orders of these commissions have the force of law, and cannot be questioned in court.
Table IV lists the years in which the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for a group
changed, the stated reason for change, and the commission responsible. As states often have
elections in different years a single commission’s recommendations may be implemented in
multiple years. In every case changes in the proportion of jurisdictions reserved for a group
reflect changes in the census population estimate for the group, and equal the change in
the census population estimate for the group. The changes in a group’s population share,
in turn, were caused by either the arrival of fresh census population estimates or centrally
mandated institutional changes which altered the existing census estimate for the group.
These institutional changes included the national shift to single member jurisdictions in
1962, the creation of a new state Haryana in 1965, and the 1976 national mandate which
required that a caste (tribe) which was identified as a scheduled caste (tribe) in any part
of the state be defined as a scheduled caste (tribe) for the entire state. Such within state
differences in the definition of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes had arisen due to the
reorganization of state boundaries over time. Finally, a national decision to freeze the total
number of jurisdictions in a state constant has prevented revisions in the extent of reservation
for a group since 1980.
The extent of political reservation in a state has defined the extent of representation
enjoyed by scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in state legislatures – Galanter [1978], and
Dushkin [1972] provide evidence on this.15 Quantitative evidence on how such represen-
tation has affected electoral and policy outcomes is, however, lacking, and Indian political
half the jurisdictions reserved in their favor [Galanter 1984].
14Membership to the Delimitation commission is restricted to a retired national court judge, a sitting
state court judge and the chief election commissioner.
15For instance, in 1967 of the 2723 unreserved state legislature jurisdictions scheduled caste legislators
occupied only 4 and scheduled tribe legislators 8. Further evidence is provided in Mendelsohn and Vicziany
[1998].
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commentators are divided on this issue. Some argue that party control of candidates’ policy
activism and the structure of legislative bargaining has led to political reservation having
little to no policy impact. For instance, Baxi [1995] has argued that scheduled caste and
scheduled tribe legislators need to appeal to the upper caste constituents in reserved jurisdic-
tions and the primarily upper caste membership of party plenary committees has prevented
them from pursuing their personally preferred policies in the legislature. Others, such as
Dushkin [1972], Joshi [1982], and Galanter [1984] claim that minority legislators act en bloc
and have succeeded in increasing transfers to their own group. These, they argue, have
included more cabinet positions for themselves, more scholarships and reservations in higher
educational institutions and, above all, more government jobs.16 Below, I use a state-level
data-set to provide evidence on the role of political reservation in affecting policy-making.
4 Empirics
4.1 Data
My data-set covers the 16 major Indian states, and spans the period 1960-1992. These states
account for over 95 percent of the Indian population. Table V provides descriptive statistics.
To examine how political reservation has affected state-level policy outcomes I consider
two types of policies. First, policies which do not restrict policy benefits to scheduled
castes and/or scheduled tribes (henceforth ‘general’ policies), and second, those which do
(henceforth ‘targeted’ policies).
I consider three general policies. First, total state per capita expenditure. This variable
allows for an examination of how changes in the political representation afforded to a group
in a state affects the state’s overall budget constraint. Second, the share of a state’s total
expenditure devoted to education. Education spending constitutes roughly 21 percent of the
average Indian state’s total spending, and is the largest general development expenditure
category in most states. Finally, I consider an asset redistribution policy – state-level land
reform. The land reform variable considered is a dummy variable which takes a value of one
16Dushkin [1972] quotes instances of such activism during the 1967-72 national parliamentary session.
Congress party was defeated on the amendment,‘The opinion of the House (that) safeguards provided in
the Constitution for the scheduled castes and tribes are not being fully implemented’ due to bloc voting by
minority legislators. She also attributes liberalization of job reservation policy (July 1968, 1970), increased
flexibility in targeted educational subsidies (1969), and a stiffening of the untouchability offences act (1970)
to their influence.
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in years that a state passes a land reform act, and is zero otherwise.17
I then examine three targeted policy variables. The first is the share of a state’s annual
budget devoted to welfare programs targeted at scheduled castes, and the second is the
share devoted to welfare programs for scheduled tribes. These programs include, among
others, group housing projects, hostels for students belonging to these groups and provision
of public goods in scheduled caste and scheduled tribe hamlets. The average state spends
roughly between 3− 4 percent of its budget on such programs. The third policy variable is
the proportion of state government jobs reserved for these two groups. Over 20 percent of
state government jobs are reserved for these two groups. Arguably, increases in the extent
of job reservation has been the most important political concession granted to scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes in post-independence India (Mendelsohn and Vicziany [1998],
Parikh [1997]).18
The main explanatory variables of interest are the group shares of scheduled caste and
scheduled tribe legislators. I measure these as the proportions of jurisdictions reserved for
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in a state. I separately control for scheduled caste
and scheduled tribe voter effects on policy by the population shares of these two groups.
All states in the sample have a scheduled caste population, but three states do not have a
scheduled tribe population.
4.2 Empirical strategy
To examine how political reservation in a state affects policy outcome Ost I estimate regres-
sions for states s and years t of the form:
Ost = αs + βt + γ1Rst + γ2Pst + γ3Tst + γ4Dst + εst
where αs and βt are state and year fixed effects. Rst denotes the proportion of jurisdictions
reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes respectively, and Pst the proportions
of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population in the state. Tst is a vector of state-
specific characteristics – these include real per capita state income, population density and
two measures of the population’s age-distribution (proportion population aged 15-34, and
proportion population over 35). Changes in the extent of political reservation only occur in
17This variable was created by Besley and Burgess [2000], who provide evidence on the political nature of
land reform activism across Indian states.
18Job quotas for different population groups was first introduced by the British on the basis of the 1922
Miller report. Parikh [1997] describes the evolution of job reservation policy in India.
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the election years. To ensure that the political reservation series does not simply proxy for
election year effects I include an electoral dummy variable Dst.
The inclusion of state and year dummies implies that changes in political reservation
which are common to all states are captured by the year dummies, and so are not a source
of variation. In this empirical specification identification of the effect of political reservation
on policy outcomes is obtained out of within state time variation, i.e. state specific changes
in reservation over time.
Such variation in the extent of reservation is attributable to changes in the state specific
population shares of these groups. The nature of the Indian political reservation mandate
implies that political reservation responds to changes in population shares only at a point
of election, and only after new census estimates have been received (for details, see Table
IV). Moreover, cross-state differences in election timing implies that changes in political
reservation caused by the arrival of a new census estimate occur in different years for different
states. These time-lags in the response of state-level political reservation to population
changes allow me to separately control for a group’s population share and the extent of
reservation it enjoys.
The validity of my identification strategy relies on three assumptions. First, that state
specific changes in political reservation are not attributable to the policy-making process in
the state. Second, that changes in these groups’ population shares, which underlie reserva-
tion changes, are not driven by policy-induced migration. Third, that the political reserva-
tion variable does not simply proxy for omitted lagged population effects. The validity of the
first assumption derives from the institutional features of political reservation as practiced
in India – changes in the extent of reservation are always due to Election and Delimitation
commission decisions, and are based on the arrival of new census population estimates for a
state. Hence the time-lag between population changes and reservation changes for a group
is determined by the institutional features of the mandate. Section 4.4 provides regression
results from alternative specifications which check the validity of the latter two assumptions.
4.3 Basic results
In Table VI I report the basic results. The first three columns provide regression results for
general policy outcomes. Column (1) tells us that increases in the proportion of scheduled
caste and scheduled tribe legislators leave total spending unaffected. However, column (2)
shows that such increases do affect spending on (at least) one general policy – education.
A one percentage point increase in the share of either scheduled caste or scheduled tribe
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legislators lowers the share of total spending going to education by slightly less than a 0.4
percentage point. Column (3) shows that this effect does not extend to asset-based redistri-
bution, as measured by land reform. Changes in the share of scheduled caste legislators show
a weak positive correlation with land reform, while the share of scheduled tribe legislators is
uncorrelated with the extent of land reform. Finally, a F-test for the equality of the policy
impact of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe legislators suggests that in the case of general
policies the interests of these two groups are aligned – in no case can I reject the null that
both groups exert identical policy influence.
The last three columns of Table VI tell us that changes in the extent of political reserva-
tion affect policies targeted towards scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Moreover, there
are significant differences in the impact that scheduled caste and scheduled tribe legislators
exert on these policies. Increases in scheduled caste legislators’ group share has a large and
significant positive effect on job quotas (column (4)). A one percentage point rise in the
group share of scheduled caste legislators increases job quotas by roughly half a percentage
point. However, I find no correlation between increases in the number of scheduled caste
legislators and spending on scheduled caste welfare programs (column (5)). In contrast,
increases in the group share of scheduled tribe legislators raises spending on tribal welfare
programs. There is roughly a one to one correspondence between increases in the share
of scheduled tribe legislators and increases in spending on tribal welfare programs (column
(6)). On the other hand, increases in their group size leave job quotas unaffected.
The finding that scheduled caste legislators affect job quotas and scheduled tribe leg-
islators affect welfare spending is consistent with differences in their group characteristics.
Relative to scheduled tribes, scheduled caste citizens are more educated and geographically
more dispersed. Hence, their relative returns from individual-specific policies, such as job
quotas, are higher. In contrast, relative to scheduled castes, scheduled tribe citizens enjoy
greater benefits from geographically localized welfare programs such as housing schemes.
Turning to voter effects I find increases in the scheduled caste population share leads to
increases both in total spending, and the share going to education. In addition, increases in
their group share correlate positively with the level of job quotas, and negatively with the
extent of redistribution towards scheduled tribes. The opposite is true of scheduled tribes.
Specifically, increases in scheduled tribe population are associated with reductions in general
and targeted redistribution. To interpret these findings it is relevant to note that while both
groups remain socio-economically disadvantaged the political activism of members of these
two groups differs. While scheduled castes have emerged as an important political bloc in
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post-Independence India, scheduled tribes remain, by and large, politically marginalized.
Hence, it is reasonable to interpret the differences in how these two groups affect policy as
reflecting differences in the political voice they enjoy.19
Theory predicts that the extent of economic inequality in the state and the political
make-up of its legislature are likely to affect the type and extent of redistribution. More-
over, changes in economic and political inequality may affect the policy impact of political
reservation.20 In Table VII I explore the empirical worth of these ideas. I measure economic
inequality in a state by the Gini coefficient, and the extent of political power concentration
in a state by the political Herfindahl Index. This index is a sum of the squares of the
legislator share of different parties in a state’s legislature. It takes the value of one when
all legislators belong to a single party, and falls in this index reflect increases in political
competition. I also examine the policy relevance of either group being a ‘swing’ group in the
legislature. Scheduled caste (scheduled tribe) legislators constitute a swing group when the
majority party relies on its scheduled caste(tribe) legislators for its majority status. For ex-
positional ease I restrict the analysis to the subset of policies which are affected by political
reservation.21
In every case the relationship between political reservation and policy outcomes is robust
to the inclusion of these additional variables. There is, however, evidence that the extent
of political concentration and economic inequality in a state has independent effects on
policy-making.
The first two columns of Table VII consider education spending. Increases in both
political concentration and economic inequality reduce education spending (column (1)). I
find mixed evidence on the role of a group’s swing status – scheduled tribe legislators lower
education spending when they constitute a swing group, while scheduled caste legislators
raise such education spending (column (2)).
Columns (3) and (4) consider job quotas. Increases in economic inequality lower job
quotas, a finding in line with the theoretical prediction that increased inequality may reduce
the popular support for such policies. In contrast, changes in the political composition of
19These findings are in line with Banerjee and Somanathan [2001]. They find that Indian districts with
a higher scheduled tribe population get fewer public goods. This, however, is not the case with scheduled
castes.
20In the model economic inequality, by changing λ∗, affects the popular support for different types of
redistribution, and thereby the policy impact of political reservation. The importance of legislative bargain-
ing procedures for the political voice enjoyed by minority legislators underlines the policy relevance of the
political makeup of the state legislature.
21I find that the results for other policies are unaltered by the introduction of these additional covariates.
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the legislature leave job quotas unaffected.
The last two columns consider tribal welfare programs. It is interesting that, unlike in the
case of job quotas, political rather than economic inequality affects such spending. Increases
in political concentration enhance spending on tribal welfare programs. It is relevant to
note that increases in political concentration are usually accompanied by increases in the
number of tribal legislators in the majority party. In contrast, such spending is lowered
when scheduled caste legislators constitute a swing group. The latter finding is suggestive
of inter-group conflict in policy-making.
In sum, it appears that the political make-up of the legislature and the extent of economic
inequality affects policy, with the effect varying by type of policy. Broad-based policies,
such as education, are hurt by increases in political and economic inequality. In the case of
targeted policies the impact of these variables depends on the characteristics of the group
targeted by the policy. Policies targeted towards scheduled tribes, a politically vulnerable
group, are sensitive to changes in the composition of the legislature. In contrast, the policies
preferred by the numerically larger and politically stronger group of scheduled castes are
vulnerable to changes in economy wide income inequality.
Taken together, the results in Table VI and VII tell us that changes in legislator identity
caused by political reservation have affected the mix of general and targeted redistribution
across Indian States. These results are consistent with a model of political economy in which
full policy commitment is absent, and minority legislators enjoy policy voice.
4.4 Robustness
My empirical analysis relies on state specific variation in political reservation in order to
identify its effects on policy outcomes. Such variation is attributable to changes in the
groups’ population shares. In addition, I exploit time-lags in the responsiveness of political
reservation to population changes to distinguish between the policy effects of changes in
political reservation afforded to a group and changes in the group’s population share. Given
this identification strategy, a possible source of omitted variable bias is inadequate controls
for group population share, by state. In this section I address this concern by reporting
results for alternative specifications which provide additional controls for secular migration
and population effects.
The main reason for changes in these groups population share has been differential fer-
tility rates. Between 1961 and 1971, relative to the general population, population growth
was slightly lower among scheduled caste and scheduled tribe populations. This was mainly
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reflected in higher infant mortality rates among these two groups. However, by the end of
the 1960s infant mortality rates had converged, and since 1971 the Indian census consistently
reports higher fertility, and population growth, rates among these groups. This finding is
also corroborated by other surveys – for instance, the Indian Demographic and Health sur-
vey for 1993 reports all India total fertility rates amongst scheduled castes, scheduled tribes,
and the rest of the population as 3.15, 3.06 and 2.60 respectively.
Inter-state migration rates in India remain low due to linguistic and cultural differences
across states.22 In addition, census data shows that scheduled caste and scheduled tribe
migration rates do not differ significantly from those of the rest of the population (Cashin
and Sahay [1995], Sebastian [1992]). However, one may still worry that even small amounts
of policy–induced migration can imply that policy outcomes and group population shares
are jointly determined. Therefore, in Panel A, Table VIII I report results for regressions
which include controls for inter-state migration. The migration controls used are the average
population share of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the neighboring states. Over 90
percent of inter-state migration in India is between neighboring states [Sebastian 1992]. It
is therefore reasonable to expect these variables to capture omitted migration effects which
may be correlated with population changes in an Indian State. Panel A tells us that the
estimated effects of political reservation on policy outcomes are robust to the inclusion of
these controls. The one exception is that increases in the group share of scheduled tribe
legislators are no longer associated with a significant negative effect on education spending.
The institutional features of political reservation imply that the extent of representation
afforded to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes responds to changes in their population
share with a time-lag. Hence, we may be concerned that the political reservation variable
confounds the effects of political representation on policy with those of lagged population
shares. To check for this possibility I estimate regressions which include as additional con-
trols population shares of these two groups lagged by different time-periods. The main
results are robust to inclusion of such lagged population variables. Panel B, Table VIII
reports the results for one such specification. This specification includes, in addition to
current population shares, population shares for these groups lagged by two periods and
the two group population shares as reported in the last census. Panel B tells us that the
estimated relationship between political reservation and various policy outcomes is robust
to the inclusion of these lagged population share variables.
Reliable state-wide estimates of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population are only
22In 1991, inter-state migration flows accounted for 5 percent of an average state’s total migration flow.
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provided by the decennial Indian census. The use of interpolated population data for inter-
census years raises the concern that the annual population shares for these groups may be
characterized by measurement error. In general, measurement error would lead to an atten-
uation bias, i.e. the estimated effects of population shares on policy outcomes will be smaller
than the true coefficients. Since no reliable alternative measures of these groups population
shares exists, I use an instrumental variables approach to check that such measurement er-
ror is not biasing my results. Instrumenting a variable which is potentially measured with
error provides consistent estimates. Panel C, Table VIII reports results for two stage least
square (2SLS) regressions, where I instrument for the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe
population shares. My instruments are the population share for these groups in the most
recent census. That is, in these 2SLS regressions I only consider that part of variation in
a group’s population share which is explained by the most recent decennial census pop-
ulation estimates. The relationship between the political reservation variables and policy
outcomes is robust to this specification, suggesting that measurement error is not driving
this relationship.
The estimation strategy used in this paper relies on state specific over time changes
in political reservation for identification purposes. Such changes in the extent of political
reservation only occur in election years, and when new census population estimates have been
received. As a final check I examine whether the results are robust to cutting the sample to
two years pre- and post - such a change. That is, for every state I restrict the sample to the
five year periods that are centered around an election in which the proportion of jurisdictions
reserved for a group changed. The idea is to check whether the discontinuous changes in
political reservation which occur in election year are associated with policy changes in this
sample. Panel D, Table VII reports the results. Reductions in the sample size implies that
our estimate of the policy effect of political reservation is more imprecise (i.e. standard
errors are larger), but both the size and significance of the estimated effects are robust to
this reduction in sample size. This specification also increases our confidence that omitted
variable bias is not underlying the observed relationship between political reservation and
policy outcomes – there is less reason to believe that the policy impact of omitted population
variables would follow a similar discontinuous pattern.
Overall, the results in this Section demonstrate that the assumptions underlying my
identification strategy are reasonable, and upheld by the data.
18
5 Discussion
This paper provides evidence that political representation for disadvantaged minorities can
provide them with policy influence. I show that political reservation for scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes in India has, in part, been responsible for the observed rise in targeted
redistribution towards these groups over the last half-century. These findings also shed light
on the functioning of the political process in India. Political reservation can affect policy
outcomes only in the absence of full policy commitment, and even then its effect remains
sensitive to the form of legislative bargaining and demographic composition of the electorate.
A number of countries, including the United States, have experimented with mandates
that seek to enhance minority representation in legislatures. However, most of these exper-
iments stop short of directly changing legislator identity. For instance, gerrymandering as
practised in the United States sought to increase African American representation in the
legislature by altering the composition of the electorate in some jurisdictions in favor of this
group. Gerrymandering was successful in increasing African American representation in the
legislature (Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran [1996], Overby and Cosgrove [1996]). How-
ever, as it altered both voter and legislator identity, isolating the policy effects of changes
in legislator identity has proven difficult. The nature of the political reservation mandate in
India allows us to make progress on this issue.
In this paper I use time lags in the responsiveness of political representation to popula-
tion changes to isolate the effect of legislator identity on policy outcomes. Such time-lags
arise because the extent of political reservation in place for a group is adjusted according
to changes in the group’s population share only when fresh census estimates arrive. Using
decennial census estimates for electoral purposes is a commonly adopted practice in most
democracies. This suggests that it may be possible to use variants of the identification strat-
egy pursued in this paper to provide empirical evidence on other features of the political
process. For instance, in many countries jurisdiction boundaries are redrawn after every
decennial census so as to ensure equal populations in each jurisdiction. The time-lags be-
tween actual population growth across jurisdictions and the equalization of population across
jurisdictions may be used to isolate the electoral consequences of legislative redistricting.
Finally, while political reservation has increased the political voice enjoyed by sched-
uled castes and scheduled tribes, the extent to which enhanced group voice translates into
improved welfare outcomes for members of these groups remains an open and important
question for future research. Clearly, the findings in this paper suggest that an important
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element of any such research agenda must involve understanding the relative successes of
targeted and broad-based redistribution in affecting the well-being of such groups.
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Mathematical Appendix
I start with some notations, and defining the basic assumptions made in the model.
Preferences
The utility function of individuals in the economy is given as
ukH = (1− t)yk + T
ukL = (1− t)yk + T + δ
Let the parties be indexed by J where J ∈ R,P . Party J maximizes it’s average member’s
payoff. That is, its objective function is:
WJ = (1− t)yk + T + ξJδ
where ξJ is the share of low caste members in a party. I assume this is less than the
group’s population share, i.e.
Assumption 1 ξJ < λL
Legislature
Let piJ denote the proportion of jurisdictions in which party J fields low caste candidates.
Let δJc and TJc be the preferred levels of targeted and non-targeted redistribution for a
legislator of caste c belonging to party J . The legislative policy determination rule is defined
as:
T ∗J = (1− ψ(piJ))TJH and δ∗J = ψ(piJ)δJL
when party J is the majority party. ψ(piJ) ∈ [0, piJ ] is a measure of low-caste legislators’
policy influence. We assume ψ(0) = 0, and ∂ψ(piJ )∂piJ > 0.
Voting
In every jurisdiction a fraction α of the voters are rational, and a fraction (1 − α) are
noise voters. Rational voters cast their vote to maximize their utility. Noise voters decisions
are uncorrelated with candidate identity. In every jurisdiction a fraction β of the noise
voters vote for party P, where β is a random variable with support [0, 1] and cumulative
distribution function G(β). The function is symmetric, such that G(β) = 1 −G(1 − β) for
all β. That is, noise voters are unbiased.23 The existence of such voters, by making election
outcomes probabilistic, ensures the voting game has an equilibrium.
23Introducing noise voters implies non-policy aspects of candidate identity e.g. charisma determines some
citizens’ voting behavior.
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The electoral outcome depends on rational voters’ voting choices, and the draw of β.
Let ε denote the difference between the number of voters who favor party P, and those who
favor party R. The party P candidate wins if







In probability terms a party P candidate wins in every jurisdiction with probability φ(ε),
where φ(ε) = 0 if ε ≤ − 1−αα ; φ(ε) = 1 if ε ≥ 1−αα , and φ(ε) = 1−G( 12 − aε2(1−α) ) otherwise.
I assume |λp − λr| < 1−αα . If citizens vote along income lines, then both parties win with a
positive probability. I assume a party which only attracts a single demographic group’s vote
enjoys a positive probability of winning, that is λkc − λ−k − λk−c > − 1−αα .
In this model, a political equilibrium is a pair of party entry decisions pi that are mutual
best responses. Every such equilibrium is associated with a probability distribution over
policy outcomes, where for party J : (i) the probability that its candidate set’s favored
policy outcomes are implemented equals its probability of electoral success, and (ii) the
policy outcomes associated with it satisfy the legislative policy-making rule.
Result 1 If Assumption 1 holds, then there always exists an equilibrium in which both
parties only field high caste candidates and no targeted redistribution is undertaken.
proof First note that with full policy commitment candidate identity is irrelevant to
policy outcomes. Hence, in this case there always exists an equilibrium in which no low
castes are fielded.
Now consider the case of no policy commitment. If piP = 0, piR = 0 then rational citizens
vote along income lines, and party P wins with probability φ(λp − λr). In equilibrium no
targeted redistribution occurs. Below, I show that piP = 0, piR = 0 constitute a pair of best
responses.
First, consider the case where λp > λ∗. Here, party R’s policy is independent of its
choice of piR since all party R members favor no redistribution. Hence piR = 0 is a best
response.
If piP = 0 then the election of party P is only associated with non-targeted redistribution.
By choosing piP > 0, instead, party P is associated with both targeted and non-targeted
redistribution (as poor low castes favor targeted redistribution). This cannot improve its
electoral outcome as rich citizens never favor targeted redistribution. In addition, assump-
tion 1 implies it will lower party P’s payoff. Hence piP = 0 is a dominant strategy for party
23
P .
Now, consider the case where λp < λ∗. Assume piR = 0. If party P sets piP > 0 then,
relative to when piP = 0 the voting decisions of rich high caste and poor low caste citizens
are unaffected. Rich low-caste citizens switch to voting for party P if




and poor high-caste citizens continue voting for party P if
(1− ψ(piP )) (λpyp + λryr) > yp
These two conditions are jointly satisfied if λrH > λ
p
L.
Such a deviation maximizes party P’s payoff if
φ(λˆ) (WP (δ∗P (piP );T
∗







> φ(λp − λr) (WP (δ∗P (0);T ∗P (0)) + (1− φ(λp − λr)) (WP (δ∗R(0);T ∗R(0))






(ξP − λL) > (φ(λˆ)− φ(λp − λr)) (λr(yr − yp))
By assumption 1 ξP < λL. Hence the left hand side is negative while the right hand side is
positive, and the above inequality cannot hold. This implies that given piR = 0, piP = 0 is




The data-set used in this paper builds on an Indian state-level data-set collated by Ozler,
Datt, and Ravallion [1996] and updated by Besley and Burgess [2000]. The data-set in-
cludes the sixteen major Indian states: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana,
Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Punjab and Harayana enter the
data-set in 1965.24
The deflators used are the ‘Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers’ (CPIAL)
and Consumer Price index for Industrial Workers’ (CPIIW), and come from Government
of India publications (Indian Labor Handbook, the Indian Labor Journal, the Indian Labor
Gazette and Reserve Bank of India Report on Currency and Finance. The reference period
for the deflator is 1973-74.
Population data This comes from the decennial censuses from 1951 through 1991 (Census
of India, Registrar General) and has been interpolated for the inter-census years. In keeping
with the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976 the Census
issued fresh estimates of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population in 1977. For the
period 1977-1981 these estimates are used as the base for interpolation. The age distribution
of population variables (proportion population aged 15-34 and proportion population aged
over 35) are similarly created, and expressed as a proportion of total population. Population
density takes interpolated total population data from the Census and divides this by total
land area of the state, as reported in the Census Atlas.
Political data These come from Election Commission reports for state elections. The
political Herfindahl index is the sum of squares of the party shares of all parties in a state’s
legislature. The scheduled caste (scheduled tribe) swing index equals one if the majority
party in the state relies on scheduled caste (scheduled tribe) legislators for its majority
status, and zero otherwise. The election dummy takes a value one in the year of a state
election, and zero otherwise.
Public finance variables The general public finance variables are from the Reserve Bank
of India Report on Currency and Finance, while the targeted expenditure variables are from
the annual Ministry of Welfare handbook. The variable descriptions are as below:
24Haryana was created in 1965, by splitting up Punjab.
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• State expenditure per capita is the total state expenditure during the budget year
expressed in real per capita terms. Data is missing for Jammu/Kashmir (1992)
• Education expenditure share is the share of total state expenditure going to elementary,
secondary, university and higher, technical and adult education.
• Scheduled caste welfare share is the share of total state expenditure going to scheduled
caste welfare plans. 1981 data is missing for Jammu-Kashmir, and 1984 data for all
states except Andhra Pradesh, Assam and Jammu-Kashmir.
• Scheduled tribe welfare share is the share of total state expenditure going to scheduled
tribe welfare plans. 1974 data is missing for Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Uttar
Pradesh, 1975 data for Uttar Pradesh and 1986 data for Andhra Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh.
Land Reform The Land reform index is a dummy variable which equals one for an Indian
state in the year in which the state legislature passed a land reform legislation, and is zero
otherwise. This variable was created and used in Besley and Burgess [2000].25
Job quota The job quota variable is the proportion of state government jobs which are
reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The data source is the annual Scheduled
caste and Scheduled tribe Commissioner’s reports.
State income The variable used is the log of the real per capita state income. The
data source is: Estimates of State Domestic Product, published by Ministry of Planning,
Government of India.
Gini coefficient This is constructed from the National Sample Surveys for India, and is
taken from the Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion [1996] data-set. 1960 and 1992 data is missing
for Jammu and Kashmir.
25Four types of reforms were considered: tenancy reform, abolition of intermediaries, ceilings on land




Note: The above criteria were the stated basis for the selection of caste and tribe communities as 'scheduled caste' and 'scheduled tribe' communities in the
6. Will not be treated as an equal by high-caste men of the same educational qualification in ordinary social intercourse
7. Is depressed on account of the occupation followed and, but for that, occupation would be subject to no social disability
Selection criteria for scheduled tribes 
2. Primitive ways of life and habitation in remote and less accessible areas
3. General backwardness in all respects 
2. Cannot be served by the barbers, water-carriers, tailors etc. who serve the caste Hindus
3. Pollutes a high-caste Hindu by contact or by proximity 
4. Is one from whose hands a caste Hindu cannot take water
5. Is debarred from using public amenities such as roads, ferries, wells or schools 
TABLE II LEGAL IDENTIFICATION OF SCHEDULED CASTES AND SCHEDULED TRIBES
Selection criteria for scheduled castes
1. Cannot be served by clean Brahmans
SCHEDULED TRIBES (ST): 1991 CENSUS
Variable Non-SC/ST SC ST
Overall population share 75.4 16.4 7.9
Within group characteristics: 
Urban population share 29.2 18.7 7.3
Literacy rate 57.8 37.4 29.6
Labor force participation rate 32.8 36 42
Percent labor force 62.1 77.1 90
in the primary sector
Percent population  below 31.15 53.1 58.4
 poverty line
(i) The source for these data is the 1991 census of India, except for poverty data. The poverty data is from the
the 1983-1984 National Sample Survey
(iii) Within group characteristics are reported as a percentage of the group's population
TABLE III ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHEDULED CASTES (SC) AND
Notes: 
(ii) The primary sector includes those employed in agricultural and allied activities.
Election year   Reason Commission
1962 Double member jurisdictions Election commission
abolished
1965 Creation of Haryana Election commission
1967 Revised in line with Delimitation commission
1961 census
1972, 1974, 1976 Revised in line with Delimitation commission
1971 census
1977, 1980 Revised in line with Election commission
1976 Area restriction removal act
TABLE IV: CHANGES IN NUMBER OF RESERVED JURISDICTIONS
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Policy variables
Total state spending 153 (87.36)
Of which:
Education spending share 21.51 (4.487)
Scheduled caste (SC) welfare 3.208 (2.196)
spending share
Scheduled tribe (ST) welfare 2.957 (4.078)
spending share
Land reform 0.126 (0.455)
Job quota 22.61 (10.39)
Political variables
Proportion jurisdictions reserved 13.93 (5.296)
for scheduled castes
Proportion jurisdictions reserved 7.36 (7.703)
for scheduled tribe
Political Herfindahl index 0.416 (0.192)
Scheduled caste swing index 0.178 (0.383)
Scheduled tribe swing index 0.072 (0.260)
Demographic variables
Proportion scheduled caste 14.27 (5.664)
population
Proportion scheduled tribe 7.367 (7.485)
population
Population density 253 (165.6)
Population aged 15-34 32.25 (1.700)
Population aged 35+ 27.38 (1.863)
Other economic variables
Real state income per capita 1030.5 (346.12)
Gini coefficient 29.7 (3.756)
Notes: 
(i) Total spending is expressed in real per capita terms, while education, SC and ST welfare spending are 
expressed as a proportion of total spending. Land reform is a dummy variable which equals one  when a
land reform act is passed. Job quota is the percentage of state govt. jobs which are reserved for  SC and
 ST. See the Data Appendix for detail on construction and source of variables. 
(ii) The data are for sixteen Indian states, Punjab and Haryana enter the sample after 1965.
TABLE V DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 scheduled caste and scheduled tribe welfare which is available for 1974-1992.
(iii) The data covers the period 1960-1992, except for the share of total spending going to 
Total state Education Land reform Job quota SC welfare ST welfare
spending spending share spending share spending share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved 2.291 -0.383*** 0.024* 0.639*** 0.027 -0.280
for scheduled castes (1.590) (0.098) (0.014) (0.167) (0.199) (0.274)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved 0.75 -0.366** 0.024 0.123 0.089 0.969***
for scheduled tribes (0.978) (0.161) (0.018) (0.234) (0.113) (0.343)
F-test for equality of scheduled caste 1.13 0.01 0 3.44 0.07 11.36
and scheduled tribe reservation (0.28) (0.92) (0.99) (0.06) (0.79) (0.00)
Population share of 4.316*** 0.262* 0.022 0.569** 0.059 -0.441**
scheduled castes (1.336) (0.140) (0.017) (0.219) (0.131) (0.187)
Population share of -2.428* -0.457** 0.013 -0.009 -0.027 -0.547**
scheduled tribes (1.411) (0.179) (0.020) (0.280) (0.137) (0.267)
F-test for equality of scheduled caste 8.58 7.29 0.08 1.92 0.13 0.08
and scheduled tribe population (0.003) (0.007) (0.77) (0.168) (0.79) (0.77)
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.75 0.21 0.9 0.76 0.86
Number of observations 503 497 503 503 271 295
(i) Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Total spending is expressed in real per capita terms. Education, SC and ST welfare spending are expressed as a proportion of total spending. Land reform
is a dummy variable which equals one when a land reform act is passed. Job quota is the percentage of state government jobs reserved for SC and ST.
(iii) Population density, proportion population aged 15-34, proportion population aged 35+, log real state income per capita and an election dummy are included
as covariates in all regressions. All regressions also include state and year dummies. 
TABLE VI POLITICAL RESERVATION AND POLICY OUTCOMES
Notes:
(iv) * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.398*** -0.349*** 0.590*** 0.607*** -0.314 -0.285
for scheduled castes (0.103) (0.101) (0.171) (0.172) (0.273) (0.265)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.348** -0.323** 0.163 0.178 0.965*** 0.975***
for scheduled tribes (0.169) (0.159) (0.240) (0.242) (0.339) (0.341)
F-test for equality of scheduled caste 0.07 0.02 2.26 2.3 11.75 11.94
and scheduled tribe reservation (0.794) (0.88) (0.130) (0.130) (0.0007) (0.00)
Population share of 0.24 0.291* 0.549** 0.565** -0.377** -0.382**
scheduled castes (0.148) (0.158) (0.234) (0.236) (0.184) (0.185)
Population share of -0.499*** -0.433** -0.006 0.025 -0.444* -0.472**
scheduled tribes (0.186) (0.181) (0.288) (0.288) (0.258) (0.257)
F-test for equality of scheduled caste 6.86 6.48 1.58 1.52 0.03 0.06
and scheduled tribe reservation (0.009) (0.01) (0.20) (0.21) (0.85) (0.80)
Gini coefficient -0.148** -0.180*** -0.146* -0.148* 0.023 0.014
(0.059) (0.057) (0.085) (0.085) (0.051) (0.054)
Political herfindahl index -1.857** -1.964** -1.092 -0.985 2.658*** 2.380**
(0.840) (0.865) (0.991) (0.973) (0.939) (0.967)
Scheduled caste swing 0.774** 0.525 -0.687**
variable (0.374) (0.95) (0.311)
Scheduled tribe swing -2.019*** -0.495 0.183
variable (0.468) (0.763) (0.910)
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.9 0.9 0.86 0.86
Number of observations 489 489 495 495 287 287
(i) Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Education and ST welfare spending are expressed as a proportion of total spending. Job quota is the percentage of state govt. jobs which are reserved for SC and ST.
The political herfindahl index is the sum of square of legislator shares of political parties. The SC (ST) swing index takes a value one if the majority party in the state 
relies on SC (ST) legislators for its majority status.
(iii) Population density, proportion population aged 15-34, proportion population aged 35+, log real state income per capita, an election dummy and state and
TABLE VII POLITICAL RESERVATION, INEQUALITY AND POLICY OUTCOMES
Notes: 
year dummies are included in all regressions as controls.
(iv) * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Education spending share Job quota ST welfare spending share
Dep. variable: Education spending Dep. variable: Job quotas Dep. variable:ST welfare spending share
Panel A: Migration controls
Explanatory variables:
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.362*** 0.390** -0.35
for Scheduled castes (0.105) (0.181) (0.289)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.213 0.250 0.891***
for Scheduled tribes (0.155) (0.213) (0.348)
Panel B: Lagged population controls
Explanatory variables:
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.426*** 0.306** 0.204
for Scheduled castes (0.100) (0.154) (0.258)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.454** -0.468 1.091***
for Scheduled tribes (0.180) (0.297) (0.373)
Panel C: Instrumenting for SC and ST population shares
Explanatory variables:
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.481*** 0.426*** -0.291
for Scheduled castes (0.099) (0.160) (0.232)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.590*** -0.364 0.894***
for Scheduled tribes (0.164) (0.231) (0.329)
Panel D: Discontinuity sample
Explanatory variables:
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.455*** 0.505** -0.071
for Scheduled castes (0.155) (0.227) (0.278)
Proportion jurisdictions reserved -0.530** -0.091 1.204***
for Scheduled tribes (0.239) (0.249) (0.368)
(i) Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Education and ST welfare spending are expressed as a proportion of total spending. Job quota is the percentage of state govt. jobs which are reserved for SC and ST.
(iii) Population density, proportion population aged 15-34, proportion population aged 35+, log real state income per capita, an election dummy, and state and year
(iv) Panel A: The migration controls included are the average population shares of scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in neighboring states. Panel B: the lagged
population controls included are SC and ST lagged two periods, and the SC and ST population shares in the last census. Panel C: The SC and  ST population shares
are instrumented by the SC and ST population share in the last census. Panel D: The discontinuity sample includes for each state data for two years prior to an 
election in which the proportion reserved jurisdictions changed, data for the election year and two subsequent years.
(v) In Panel D, the number of observations for the education spending and job quoata regressions is 178, and for the tribal welfare spending regression is 82.
Notes:
(vi) * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
TABLE VIII: ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
dummies are included in all regressions as controls.
